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AND LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation; 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation; 
UTAH AND SALT LAKE CANAL COM-
pANY, a corporation; NORTH JORDAN 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; 
SOUTH JORDAN CANAL COMPANY, a 
corporation; and EAST JORDAN IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
A:\IERICAN FORK IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a corporation; PLEASANT GROVE IRRI-
GATION COMPANY, a corporation; and 
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of the 
State of Utah (successor in office of Ed H. 
Watson, former State Engineer of the State 
of Utah); KENNECOTT COPPER CORPO-
RATION, a corporation; UTAH POWER 
AND LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation; 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation; 
UTAH AND SALT LAKE CANAL COM-
PANY, a corporation; NORTH JORDAN 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation; 
SOUTH JORDAN CANAL COMPANY, a 
corporation; and EAST JORDAN IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 
7626 
This reply brief is necessary to correct several mat-
ters in respondents' brief which could be quite mislead-
ing here. 
It seems to us that the effort is to escape the funda-
mental issues involved, by ignoring basic principles, by 
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raising irrelevant matters, and by some confusion of the 
issues and evidence. 
We will not take the space to recite all instances 
of these, nor will we pursue them in the order in which 
they occur in respondents' brief, but we will refer to 
and comment upon some more important examples, and 
will do so in connection with one of the three subjects 
to which they seem to relate. 
In this brief, we will cite the record by the use of 
the letter "R", and the transcript by the use of "T". 
We will cite our first brief by use of the abbreviation 
"A. bf.", and respondents' brief by use of "R. bf.". We 
will use "we" for brevity, as referring to the defendant 
Canal Companies and the Kennecott Corporation. 
The parties hereto, on the Index pages of their two 
respective briefs, have set up the three points relied 
upon on both sides. Both relate to the same three general 
subjects. Since these can be thus easily compared, repi-
tition here is not necessary. If any of appellants' stated 
points there is correct, they are entitled to a reversal 
This does not appear to be questioned. 
Appellants' first point is a legal one, and respond-
ents have not met this by argument or authority. They 
did so by restating a somewhat similar proposition, 
changing ours so as to eliminate vital elements which 
are present in this case. 
The second point is a factual one, and is squarely 
met by a contradiction of the conclusion derived from the 
facts. 
The third point involved mixed matters of fact and 
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law, and is 1net by another statmnent on the sa1ne sub-
ject, with some added assun1ptions. 
We will follow these three subjects in the order 
pursued in the briefs. 
POINT I. 
The Authorities Support Appellants' Position: 
By reference to the Index pages of the two briefs, 
it will be at once noted that our staten1ent contains the 
important ele1nent that lower rights here are dependent 
upon the run-off flow and seepage from the direct appli-
cation to which the waters involved have been applied. 
Appellants omit this iinportant matter. The proposition 
that they argue is stated as follows: 
"The respondents Inay, by a change of the 
nature of use application, acquire the right to 
temporarily store water, the direct flow of which 
has heretofore been appropriated by them, and 
thereafter release such water for irrigation with-
in the same area, when such change can be made 
without impairing any vested or existing rights, 
and will serve to prevent waste and permit a more 
beneficial use of the water, particularly in view 
of the fact that the appellants are in no position 
to complain because frequently they do not utilize 
the rights which they claim might be impaired, 
and must release water which they impound into 
Great Salt Lake." 
Of course, it is easier .to try to support an ambiguous 
statement of this kind than to try to meet the relevant 
point, as stated by us (A. bf. 22). The main difficulty 
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with this statement by respondents is that it is not a 
statement of what we have to consider here, and the 
determination of it is not decisive of this case. It is 
also impossible to tell whether it is contended that re-
spondents may do what they propose by reason of the 
last clause alone, or by virtue of any other of the qualify-
ing clauses, or by reason of the purported statement of 
law contained in the first clause. 
As we have pointed out before, this statement, and 
the statements of respondents generally, proceed on the 
theory that nobody else is interested in this water, or 
has any right to be. Yet, the fact that appellants' rights 
depend upon the run-off flow from the direct applicati~n 
of the high water is the decisive element under the 
authorities cited (A. bf. 30-37). 
If there is one thing on which we must agree, it is 
that the waters of American Fork Creek flow naturally 
to Utah Lake. This is recited in respondents' application. 
Respondents' right is to use some of this flow, as it 
passes :the area, for direct irrigation only. This is a 
separate and distinct right from a right to store. The 
application to change is one to withhold such otherwise 
passing waters from the high water flows, and release 
and apply the waters withheld later on the same lands. 
This is the application here. And, as a change proposi-
tion, it can be allowed only if it can and will be adminis-
tered so as to insure that the now dependent rights will 
be fully protected. 
We have cited (A. bf. 31-37) the cases that have 
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passed upon such atte1npts, and, in each one, the right 
to so withhold has been denied. 
If respondents 1uay, as they recite, "acquire the right 
to tmnporarily store" by this application, they certainly 
do not. have a right to acquire such right. In other words, 
they do not, as they repeatedly urge throughout their 
brief, have a "yested right" to a change of nature of use, 
as sought. 
We cited (A. bf. 39) the language used in Moyle v. 
Salt Lake City, that the right to change "is not an abso-
lute or vested right," and involves the "element of judg-
ment" on the part of the State Engineer. 
vVe cited, also, (A. bf. 65) U. S. v. Caldwell, wherein 
this Court said: 
"A cmnplete answer to the contention, how-
ever, is that appellants' right to change the place 
of diversion is not an absolute or vested right, but 
is only a conditional or qualified one. No such 
change can be made, if thereby the public, or any 
other appropriator, prior or subsequent, is ad-
versely affected." 
As is also pointed out in the J.l/ oyle case, above, 
there is a distinction made in the statute (100-3-3) as to 
this kind of application for "pennanent" change. As to 
applications for "temporary" change, it is recited that 
the "State Engineer shall make an investigation, and if 
such temporary change does not impair any vested 
rights of others, he shall make an order authorizing the 
rhange." 
But, as pointed out, there is no such language in 
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dealing with pennanent change, and here we have ap-
plication for a permanent change. So that, while this 
proposed change may or will "adversely" affect our 
rights, respondents do not have a "vested right" to it, 
even if it may not. The Engineer may, and here does, 
have problerns of administration, independent of those of 
the litigating protestants. 
The statute says: 
"No permanent change shall be made except 
on the approval of the application therefor by the 
State Engineer." 
In all of the provisions of our water code, dealing 
with the Engineer's duties, and his authority, and with 
the many kinds of applications provided for his approval, 
~this is the only instance in which it is expressly stated 
that the thing sought cannot be had "except" on "the 
approval" of the State Engineer. 
This is important, and it probably is because this, 
as well as the problems of distribution which are after-
ward involved in all such changes, calls for the applica-
tion of special judgment, training, and experience. 
It would seem certain that, when a task is so com-
pletely committed to a particular administrative office, 
his determination could not be properly over-ruled by 
the courts, on a mere difference of opinion (A. bf. 77, 
86), or for anything short of capricious conduct, amount-
ing to an abuse of discretion. There is nothing like 
this alleged or claimed here. 
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But more directly on Point I, it is noted that re-
spondents do cite one ca8e supporting their statement, 
but none refuting ours. 
They cite Seuen Lakes ResetToir (Colo.) (R. bf. 36), 
as if this were a discovery of theirs, omitting to mention 
that we had cited it (A. bf. 30) for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing it, by pointing out that, in that case, there 
were no rights dependent upon run-off from the former 
use of water involved. The opinion recites that no other 
rights could be affected. 
The reservoir company had purchased new rights, 
and took them into the Big Thornpson River. This river 
is one of the large streams tributary to the Platte River. 
They sought to then turn out and store the water. The 
opinion restricts the decision to these "priorities" pur-
chased" for such storage (93 P. at 486). 
On rehearing, it is further pointed out that, in that 
c~se, "there cannot possibly be any greater burden im-
posed upon the con1mon source of -supply of the respec-
tive ditches owned or controlled by the parties * * * ." 
Also, it is pointed out (93 P. at 497) that this deci-
sion is not contrary to Colo. M & E.- Co. v. Lorimer, 56 P. 
185. This latter case is one of the cases cited by us (A. 
bf. 31, 43), and it holds that, where lower rights are de-
pendent upon the run-off from the right of use by the 
prior appropriator, such appropriator cannot withhold 
and store a portion of the water which he is entitled to 
use directly. As the opinion says: 
"Otherwise expressed, * * * although the ir-
rigation company could change the use of its ap-
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propriation from irrigation to that of storage, it 
could not divert water for that purpose, which 
would result in a diversion measured by either 
volume or time to the damage of plaintiff." 
Thus, in one of these two cases it was held that the 
change could be 1nade, and, in the other, it was held that 
it could not be made. And the difference is that, in this 
latter mentioned case, the lower users used the water, 
and their right of use might be affected as to volume or 
time by its being stored. That is the situation here, and 
there is no value in quoting from a case in which that 
point could not be involved, at all. 
We also cited other cases (A. bf. 33) involving stor-
age of direct flow wa:ters, including the Finley case (A. 
bf. 34), which is in point on the withholding of such 
water, where there are lower dependent rights. 
Other cases follow, discussing the principle, includ-
ing the Williams case (Or.) (A. bf. 36), which is again 
in point on the question of diverting by an upper user, 
when lower rights depend on the run-off from the former 
use. 
Respondents have conveniently ignored all these 
cases. 
And, incidentally, it is important to mention, at this 
point, that, throughout respondents' brief, they refer to 
this proposal of theirs as something that is "common in 
irrigation practice;" or that occurred in "numerous" or 
"frequent" instances, and is "similar to that utilized on 
countless other streams" (R. bf. 8). This is just not so. 
In introducing the cases above referred to in our 
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brief { ~\. bf. 30), we called attention to an article by an 
author, ~Ir. J. E. Ethell, in which he stated that, U:(> to 
that time (1910), on the question as to whether an 
"owner of a prior right to water for direct application 
(is) privileged to store water for future use," he had 
found only two cases. And this plan is not only extremely 
rare, but, in this State, was completely new, with this 
case. 
Note, also, that the question that Mr. Ethell is dis-
cussing is whether such owner is privileged to withhold 
from his own right, and store, without reference to the 
other point as to dependent lower rights. Neither side 
has found a single case where an application for such -
change has been made before to a public board or official. 
On the point of run-off, which we are now discussing, 
we made a thorough search, and found only the articles 
and cases cited. Respondents have cited none additional, 
except that they do refer (R. bf. 37) to another Colorado 
case, Greeley & Loveland Irr. Co. et al. v. Farmers 
Pawnee Ditch Co., 146 P. 247, and to the Gunnison Irr. 
Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co., 52 Utah 347, 147 
P. 852. 
This Utah case is not in point, and there does not 
seem to be much claim that it is. It does state, however, 
as quoted, "that a diS'tinction may be drawn between a 
direct irrigation for immediate use on the one hand and 
storage for future use on the other." See, also, on that 
Rocky Ford v. Kents (Utah), 141 P. (2) 629, par. 1. 
The Colorado case (146 P. 247), however, does decide 
a point which is directly contrary to the respondents' 
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position on Point I. Respondents (R. bf. 37) stated that 
"the sarne principle is enunciated in this case as is de-
cided in the 8 even Lakes Reservoir case above referred 
to." The fact is, that the point decided in that case is not 
involved in this Greeley and Loveland case, but the 
latter case is pertinent to our case here. 
In this case ( 14 7 P. 24 7), the Greeley and Loveland 
Cor_npany operated an irrigation 3ystem on the Big 
Thornpson River, 175 miles above the irrigation district 
of the plaintiff Pawnee Ditch Company. A storm oc-
curred at the upper district, producing a substantial 
amount of water. The defendant irrigation company had 
a right to and could beneficially use the water, but their 
gates were not set for it, and they could make better use 
of it later in the season by then storing it, which they 
had the facilities to do, and which they did. 
The ditch company brought the suit, to require them 
to release the water down the stream, and to restrain 
them from again storing water which they were entitled 
to use for direct irrigation. 
The opinion, which is also by Judge Gabbert of the 
Colorado Supreme Court, denied the right of the irriga-
tion company to store the water, and ordered judgment 
in accordance with the prayer. This was against the same 
contentions tha,t are made here, that they were only tak-
ing it at a time when they had a right to use it, and in 
quantities which they then had a right to use, and ~tore­
lease for use on their same lands, all of which, it seems, 
was not disputed. 
In this Colorado case, there was also the additional 
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defense contention that the lower ditch company had 
not proved that, if the water had not been held, it would 
have been available for use by plaintiffs. This, again, is 
a contention which is repeatedly made in respondents' 
brief~ that we are required to show such unavailability 
and damage at all ti1nes. This, of course, is entirely er-
roneous. ~-\11 that need appear is that the effect of grant-
ing this application would be such that i,t could not be 
insured that our rights would not be "adversely affected." 
On this point, Judge Gabbert ( 146 P. at 249) said: 
"On behalf of the defendant cornpany, it is 
contended that the cornplaint fails to state a cause 
of action, because it is not alleged that, had the 
flood water not been intercepted by storage, it 
would have reached the headgate of the plaintiff. 
It is also (•laimed the testimony fails to establish 
that, had this water not been diverted, it would 
have been available for the use of plaintiff; and 
hence the judgn1ent is contrary to the law and 
the evidence. These propositions can be con-
sidered together. The water involved did not be-
long in specie to the plaintiff; but when it appears, 
as it does, from the allegations of the complaint 
and proof, that it has a decreed priority to the 
use of water from the stream, the flow of which 
would presumably be augmented by the flood 
water diverted, and at the time of such diversion 
was in need of water to supply its priorities. i't 
will be presumed that the volume in the stremn 
was depleted to its injury as the result of the 
wrongful diversion by the defendant company. 
So that, instead of plaintiff being required to al-
lege and prove such facts, it was incumbent upon 
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the defendant company to allege and prove them 
in order to excuse its wrongful act." 
Like the Colo. M. & E. v. Lorimer case (56 P. 185), 
and our case here, this then again is storage "which 
would result in a diversion 1neasured by either volume or 
time." 
Preventing Waste is Not Involved: 
In stating their first point, to the effect that re-
spondents may acquire, by change application, the right 
to store water, a limitation which they impose on the 
generality of this statement is that they may so acquire 
"when such change * * * will serve to prevent waste." 
Respondents talk a great deal about preventing 
"waste," but do not ·seem to tie it into anything that af-
fects the rights of anybody here. And, so far as we can 
see, there are no rights which depend on this, at all. 
This reference could be to any of three matters men-
tioned by them: 
1. The first is that this application might have 
some affect on possible early waste by them. 
2. The second is that it has some connection with 
alleged waste by us. 
3. And the third is a reference by them to the 
laws applicable to waste waters. 
1. The first of these can only be by way of some 
kind of admission that, by turning out early all of the 
water that they can get into their ditches, they might 
commit some waste. And this involves, also, the sugges-
tion that, if they hold back some of it, instead of putting 
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it into their ditches, then thi8 waste would be prevented. 
There i8, of eour8e, no 8ense or validity in such sug-
gestion, because they never did aequire the right to waste 
any water. .And, a8 the Engineer has said in his opinion, 
they could expect to hold back only when they could 
beneficially use. 
And, it should be pointed out that, while their ex-
pert witness, ~Ir. Richards, has assumed that they had 
a right to fill their ditches in the early season, when they 
could (and so has respondents' counsel), the watermaster 
has denied that they so use water, or that they could so 
beneficially use it all, except "if it is a dry year" (T. 58). 
He also testified, contrary to their assumptions, that 
"run-off water, could vary according to storms, too." Al-
so, and contrary to what respondents say in their brief 
(R. bf. 6-7), the witness testified that "when we get the 
ditches cleaned out, we can take care of quite a lot of 
water * * * up to about between 300 or 350 second feet 
* * * I do not think we can take care of any more than 
that" (T. 43). 
We think it is perfectly fair to say that 300 second 
feet is about the capacity of the ditches of the "three 
companies" there referred to by this witness. They seem 
to agree that some of this early use of high water has not 
been highly beneficial. 
It is important to note that, by the decree (R. 113), 
Lehi is entitled to only one-sixth of the water of Aineri-
can Fork Creek up to July 1st of each year. So that there 
would have to be 600 cfs. before they would be entitled 
to 100 cfs. Also, that American Fork is entitled to only 
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80 cfs., and that then the secondary users take over in 
that area (T. 71-72; Searle). 
H~ also said ( T. 49), "some years you water early 
and some you don't. It's according to the season." 
And, the following occurs (T. 50).: 
"Q. Well, in April it would be pretty wet from the 
snow and rain, would it not~ 
"A. VVell, you wouldn't water if it was snowing 
and raining." 
This is the only witness of respondents who testified 
as to these facts, and his testimony is contrary to what 
is assumed in their briefs and arguments. 
The witness went on to testify (T. 50) that, if the 
water went through the ditches, and was not used on the 
land, it would go to the "mill-pond, sloughs, and lake;" 
and (T. 52) that there would not be as much water go 
down there in August as there would in April; and that, 
in a dry month, in a dry year, "there wouldn't be any get 
down" to the Lake (T. 52). 
Respondents cannot get authority to store any water 
they might otherwise waste. 
2. The second reference is to our alleged "waste" 
of water from the Lake. Not only is respondents' right 
unaffected by any claim of this kind, but, as we think we 
have demonstrated (A. bf. 24-27), the claim is utterly 
untenable. Because, in three years since 1924 (T. 300), 
water has been released into the Jordan River from 
Utah Lake, and then not in the season in which respond-
ents propose storing the water (T. 147-149). They ex-
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pect to get a pennanent right to store every year. 
Since we have cited the fact::; and the record, there 
is no excuse for the irresponsible and reckless statement::; 
made by respondent::; with relation to this matter. They 
have not proved that any water that is so turned frorn the 
Lake is wasted, at all. They put on .Mr. Gardner, the 
Utah Lake Con1nlissioner, as their witness on this, and he 
testified that he understood there were rights on the 
Jordan River, clear down stream into Davis County, and 
he did not know that any water turned out was wasted 
(T. 151-154); and no one else testified that any was. 
Not only are the facts ignored, but also the hold-
ings in the Colledge case, in which case the agreement 
there approved set up a Lake Com1nission to control 
the .water, and respondents persist in saying that the 
appellants turn out and waste the water, when we have 
no more to do with it than the respondents do. 
They also ignore the fact, pointed out in our brief 
(A. bf. 26), that there is an approved application (No. 
12114) by the Federal Bureau of Recla1nation to with-
hold from the Lake 30,000 acre feet at any time that the 
State Engineer can anticipate that unappropriated water 
will be spilled from the Lake. It would be only at such 
time, and only after existing rights are supplied, that 
respondents could gain any right to withhold such water, 
even if they had filed an application so to do. 
3. The next matter of waste to which they may 
refer in their statement of Point I is their reference to 
the law of waste water (R. 35-36). This entirely new 
thought, however, needs little discussion. 
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We are here dealing with the right to change an 
established direct use in one irrigation district and sys-
tmn, when rights to the run-off from the use have been 
acquired for use in a lower and separate irrigation dis-
trict and system; and it has absolutely nothing to do with 
the law of reclaiming waste water, as discussed in the 
authorities cited, or in the Utah cases mentioned, by 
respondents (R. bf. 36). 
And, this whole discussion by respondents, as we say 
again, has nothing to do with their acquirement or denial 
of the privilege of the change actually sought by the 
application here. 
"More" Or "Highest Beneficial Use" is Not Involved: 
The next qualification that respondents place upon 
their general statement of Point I is that they may ac-
quire a right "when such change * * * will * * * permit 
a more beneficial use of the water." 
We do not think that a more or higher beneficial 
use is determinative of the rights of the parties here, at 
all. If water is required for any beneficial use, it may 
be so used. And, except under statutory provisions deal-
ing with water for domestic, as opposed to industrial 
or some other less necessary use, we have never known 
of any discrimination between beneficial uses by users, 
because of more valuable crops, or any other similar 
reason. 
Respondents, on this, show a very clear conviction 
that use by them is the "highest" and also the "most 
beneficial" use, and that any water that goes past them 
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and i~ used in Salt Lake County is either totally 
.. wasted, .. or is put to a less beneficial use. 
They were all stea1ned up about this before the 
Trial Court, and still are; and yet, so far as their right 
is· concerned, or, for that n1atter, the rights of irrigators 
in Salt Lake County are concerned, it makes no difference 
whether the water is used late or early on cheap crops, 
or late or early on valuable ones. This was a subject 
for good propaganda talk below; but it is of no actual 
help here. 
\Ve point out, also, that there is not a word of evi-
dence in this record, or any proof of any kind, that any-
one will or can raise any different crops, if this applica-
tion is gran ted. 
There is talk in the pleadings to the effect that they 
can use water later on sugar beets, or "more valuable 
crops." It is common knowledge, of course, that they 
raised sugar beets here for many, many years, and 
supplied the sugar beet factory which stood at Mulliner's 
Pond near Lehi; also, that that factory has been torn 
down and removed a number of years ago. 
But, there is no proof by any water user, or at all, 
that they will put the water on any crop different from 
those on which it has been and is being used, or on which 
it is now being used in Salt Lake County. 
Appellants Injured by the uEffect" of the Proposed Plan: 
The last limitation on the general statement of 
respondents' Point I is that they may acquire the right 
to store the water involved, "because frequently" we 
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are not able to utilize our right. This is not true; in fact, 
we always use all available water (T. 232, line 11). 
However, on this, it is argued (R. bf. 33) that we are 
not in position to object "to proposed change ** * at 
le.ast during the time such wastage is being carried on, 
or when such wastage affects the supply in Utah Lake 
during any hold-back in the high-water season." 
This remarkable statement is that if, at any time, 
water is being turned out of Utah Lake, and so wasted, 
then, and at that time, respondents can hold back such 
amount of water in this proposed reservoir. Therefore, 
the application should be approved. 
This shows how completely the judgment, obtained 
in the Lower Court, depends upon the contention and 
the finding of the Court of alleged waste of water from 
Utah Lake. This is something that the State Engineer 
and the other defendants never suspected could be in-
volved in this application, at all, and, certainly, appel-
lants do not think that it is. 
(So, parenthetically, and mainly for Point III ante, 
here is another impossible administrative problem for 
the State Engineer, as he would have to determine, each 
time that water is being released from the Lake to Jordan 
River, as to how much of such water is being lawfully 
used by appropriators between that point and Great Salt 
Lake. And, if he thus determines that some of this is 
being wasted, he must go up to respondents' reservoir 
and hold back an equal amount. It is not indicated why 
he would not have to hold back for the Bureau of Re-
clamation at Deer Creek, instead.) 
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'Ve have discussed the point involved (A. bf. :2-l-), 
and won't go over it again . .And, it is clear that no waste 
is proved here, even in those three years occurring since 
19:2-!, in which son1e water was released, before the ap-
pellant canal con1panies started irrigation (T. 152-154, 
300, 307-308). Also, that any water which may be ex-
pected to spill, if not required below, is appropriated, up 
to 30,000 acre feet, by the Bureau of Reclamation (A. bf. 
26) . 
. All that this application seeks is to change respond-
ents' direct use of water back up to a reservoir, before 
such water reaches the Lake. It has no relation to rights 
in water that 111ight be released from the Lake (A. bf. 
:25-:26). 
It appears, without dispute, that irrigation fron1 
the Lake starts the first part of May usually, and practi-
cally always somewhere between April 19th and May 
lOth (T. 156, line 19). Also, that the withholding, which 
by the application could begin April 15th, ordinarily 
could not start until about June, when the snow would 
be melting up on top there. This, then, if withheld, would 
directly affect the rights of the appellant users, as well 
as other rights, on the Lake. 
And, this above quoted portion of respondents' Point 
I see1ns to us to show two additional intportant miscon-
ceptions in this case : 
a. The conception that they are dealing with simply 
one turn of water, or water that might become available 
for a few days-say every five or ten years, under some 
special circumstances-when, in fact, in this case we are 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
dealing with an application for the privilege of construct-
ing a permanent dam with a permanent right to withhold 
and store out of high water in every year, regardless 
of the conditions recited. 
b. Also, the conception that we are contending that 
there may not, at some time, be a moment or a day or a 
week when they could withhold water without injury to 
what we might be doing at that time. We are objecting 
to "the effect" of a permanent plan, which cannot be 
operated without injury to our rights, as the Engineer 
has found. 
The thing that we are claiming is our acquired right 
in the use of the run-off from respondents' direct irriga-
tion use. This run-off supplies our right. It supplies 
no right of respondents. It is not a question of tempo-
rary inconvenience. It is a matter of change of condi-
tions, which change will permanently jeopardize all 
rights on this source in this County. 
The cases, such as the Gunnison case, cited by re-
spondents (R. bf. 38), predicate the privilege of change 
upon the, premises that it "does not injuriously affect 
the rights of others." 
The language of the statute, 100-3-3, is that "no such 
change shall be made if it impairs any vesteQ. right." 
This is the plan the State Engineer had to pass up-
on. He had to determine whether the plan could be set 
up, and administered, so as to insure that appellants' 
rights would be fully protected. It cannot be, and will not 
be. But, to respondents, that makes it not at all "un-
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feasible.'' The nwre water the plan keeps awny from n::-;, 
the Inore "practieable and fea::;ible'' it is. 
This position of respondents (R. bf. 33) also dis-
eloses son1e very i1nportant ad1nissions here. 
The whole contention that they have the right to 
withhold and store, when W'ater would othenvise be spill-
ing frmn the Lake. ad1nits that the water would reach 
the Lake prmnptly. if not so withheld. And this is true, 
as 'Ne have shown (A. bf. 40-45). It is so plain, in fact, 
that it is not surprising that respondents unconsciously 
concede it. 
They make the san1e ad1nission, when they argue that 
their plan might save some water loss from evaporation, 
because the 1,000 acre feet of water, if not held back, 
would expand the surface area of the Lake by about 35 
acres. They clai1n that this would be about the size of 
their basin reservoir, as proposed, but contend that it 
is colder up there, so that the evaporation would be less. 
All of the testin1ony on this, and the argument, re-
lates to the increased surface at the tin1e of the proposed 
withholding, and, therefore, of course, admits that the 
water would be in the Lake, except for the withholding. 
There is an additional contention, which is related 
to the foregoing discussion, and which should, therefore, 
probably be rnentioned before we leave Point I. This is 
the contention mentioned (R. bf. 25), and reiterated else-
where, to the effect that, if anybody were injured by the 
water not going into the Lake, as it now does, this would 
be "inferior" or "secondary" rights, and not the rights of 
these protestants and defendants. We have cited the 
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Lake Commissioner's testimony that the water never 
supplies all the Lake rights and, above, that we need all 
the water we can get into the Lake.· 
And we cannot find in the record any proof of any 
rights that are inferior to the rights of these defendant 
parties, although we do mention in our brief the Bureau 
of Reclamation's approved application for the privilege 
of holding back waters from the Lake. 
It is sufficient to say that the defendant canal com-
panies' rights are, in fact, secondary to the "primary 
rights" on Utah Lake, and are not the "primary rights," 
as respondents seem to assume. The Morse Decree (Ex. 
"13") shows this, and it also requires the five Asso-
ciated Canal Companies to see to it, by pumping water 
or otherwise, that the actual primary rights in the Lake 
are supplied. This is a condition imposed upon our right 
to withdraw water from the Lake. It also recites these 
primary rights, and shows that many of these are down 
the river, northerly from any diversions by these canal 
companies. We pump water every year to supply them. 
Of course, the Kennecott rights are rights that were 
acquired on applications filed subsequent to this De-
cree; and, as shown by their chief engineer (T. 368-369), 
their rights are seldom supplied, and it is vital to their 
rights that this water get into the Lake during the early 
season. And, it is also plain that, whatever portion may 
get into it in the Fall, would generally be of no benefit 
at all. 
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POINT II. 
The respondents say, as to this point: "The record 
discloses that the proposed plan for diversion and stor-
age would not interfere with the rights of the lower 
users, either as to volun1e, time of use, or otherwise." 
Leaving the question of volu1ne for a rnoment, it 
seems re1narkable that anyone would say that you could 
hold back, for two to six months, high water which, in 
natural course of drainage and use must prmnptly go to 
the Lake, when the ground is saturated from early melt-
ing of snows and frorn rains, and that this would not 
interfere with the appellant users below, as to time. 
It is undisputed that we have to .;;tart pumping from 
the Lake in :May, or before, in each year, to get water 
for irrigation; and we start irrigating in S.alt Lake 
County between April19 and May 10 each year. 
And this is claimed, even though the water may be 
released frmn this proposed reservoir as late as October; 
and, in any event, in the later irrigation season; and will, 
by the very purpose of the undertaking, be released in 
the later, hotter, and drier months. The time that it 
could reach the Lake would, necessarily, be later, and 
its further delay, by greater re-uses, clear down through 
the swamp areas to the Lake, must, also, result in 
greater loss by evaporation and transpiration. 
We believe we have sufficiently established this, and 
have also demonstrated that it is a matter of common 
knowledge that, not only must such delay in time occur, 
but a very substantial loss would occur (See A. bf. 38-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
45). The opinion in the Pawnee Ditch Co. case, supra, 
says: "it will be presumed." 
Respondents do not cite any record to support their 
statement. They claim that their expert witness stated 
the conclusions that the plan could be operated so that 
lower users would "not be substantially damaged." The 
State Engineer, who is charged with adopting adminis-
trative policies which will prevent interference, says 
that it cannot be done. 
Respondents talk about findings of fact by the Court, 
as to such interference. The Court makes no finding 
of fact on this, and no findings of fact on any contro-
verted issue here, at all. The Court states only conclu-
sions to the effect that the "approval of the application 
would not infringe on vested rights," and states, as a rea-
son, that water spills to Great Salt Lake in some years 
(R. 116). 
In Sigurd City v. State, et al, 152 P. (2) 154, at 156, 
this Court says something that is exactly applicable 
here: 
"'-, 
"But the court in its findings of fact as well 
as in its conclusions of law and decree concluded 
* * * that the defendants were the owners of all 
of the waters taken by plaintiff into its pipelines 
at Rosses Creek. Such conclusions, even though 
stated as findings of fact, are really conclusions 
. of law, and to the extent that they are in conflict 
with the views herein expressed are not supported 
·by the facts and are therefore set aside." 
We call attention now to a few matters stated by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
respondent~ in connection with this point, in which they 
appear to be entirely mistaken. 
Respondents' witness, ~Ir. Richards, testified only 
that the taking of this water into the proposed reservoir 
would not affect availability of water in Utah Lake "to 
any substantial degree," and indicated that he based 
this 1nainl~· on the fact that this particular proposal is to 
hold back 1,000 acre feet, which he thought, all told, was 
not a "substantial" mnount. That, however, is wholly 
i1mnaterial in this case. It is rights, not quantities, that 
are controlling here. And, as we have demonstrated 
(A. bf. -!0--!1), if these respondents can so hold back that 
ainount, they can hold back any other amount, or the 
total flow of American Fork Creek; and so can any other 
upper user, on any other tributary to the Lake, or to any 
supply in the State. 
Respondents' witness also proceeded upon the theory 
that water, reaching the Lake in October, would be "as._. 
available" as water reaching it in the earlier irrigation 
season. This is totally wrong, as to time and as to quan-
tity, too, as to anyone except the "primary" users on the 
Lake. And, the undisputed fact is that, because the Lake 
is always drained down to the bottom, water reaching the 
outer borders of the Lake late would not reach the body 
of water from where it could be pumped; at least, a great 
deal of it never could. 
Respondents next attack (R. bf. 41) our witness, :Jir. 
Earl, and also Mr. Gardner, notwithstanding the fact 
that Mr. Gardner is a Commissioner on the Lake, ap-
pointed by the State Engineer, and that respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
called him first as their own witness (T. 146). The fact is 
that the testimony of both of these witnesses is entirely 
intelligent, consistent, and correct. The trouble is that 
respondents either do not understand it, or they want to 
misconstrue it. 
This is done largely by taking the testin1ony of these 
Engineers, with relation to percolating underground 
waters, and discussing it as if they were testifying as to 
surface run-off, and thus claiming a contradiction. There 
are no contradictions. 
As to the waters that enter to depth, it is true that 
no witness did, and nobody can, tell exactly when this 
would reach the Lake, or whether a good deal of it would 
or would not reach the Lake at all, or how much the loss 
would be. 
Mr. Earl's testimony is that of an expert Engineer, 
who carries great responsibility and has had a great deal 
of experience in water matters, and who has carried on 
experiments on the most effective methods of irrigation 
( T. 332-338). His testimony is not only consistent, but 
very intelligent and fair, when examined and understood. 
It is not shown, as stated (R. bf. 43), that the heavy 
run-off in the Spring would not reach the Lake until the 
close of the irrigation season. Not only is it not shown, 
but the contrary has been shown, and this is admitted, a~ 
we have shown above, by the respondents' own conten-
tions. It is only about seven miles (T. 318), and down-
hill (See Ex. "15"), from the mouth of the Canyon to 
the Lake. 
In this connection, they discuss our reference to a 
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nun1ber of applications filed in the 8tate Engineer's 
Office since this one was filed, including· additional ones 
on supplies to Utah Lake, and to our contention that we 
are trying to settle a principle and policy applicable to 
this kind of change application for the first time in this 
State. And, on this, they again argue (R. bf. -13) that, 
if this change were multiplied indefinitely, the amount 
of usable water would not be substantially affected, be-
cause "loss of evaporation n1ight be reduced and waste 
into Great Salt Lake might be minimized." 
This is not correct, in fact. But thus, we are back 
again to their admission that this water, if not held 
back, would reach the Lake, and thus cause spilling to 
the Jordan River, or more evaporation by expanding the 
surface area of the Lake. 
Conunencing at page 8 of our first brief, we set up 
the U.S.G.S. 1neasurements taken 4.10 miles up the Creek 
from respondents' diversion point. And then, taking all 
of the readings available down at their point of diver-
sion, attempt to arrive at a reasonable high water flow 
down there for the 22 years in which the Government 
took these upper measurements (Ex. "4"). 
The respondents (R. bf. 10) make some very inac-
curate and unfair statements with reference to this 
comparison. In the first place, nobody can rightly ques-
tion the measurements by the U.S.G.S. (Ex. "4"), nor 
can they question, as respondents do, the measure-
ments made by the State Engineer's Office (Ex. "7") 
from 1938 to 1940 (A. bf. 10). 
By taking all the readings available at the point 
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of diversion, including the State Engineer's readings, 
and what we have referred to as the Gardner reading 
(A. bf. 10), but which is also the same reading for 1938 
taken by Mr. Warnock, one of respondents' watermasters 
(Ex. "CC"), and also taking Mr. Searle's readings for 
the years 1944 to 1948 (Ex. "L"), we had nine readings 
in nine years, as indicated in our brief, for comparison 
with the U.S.G.S. readings (Ex. "4") for nine out of the 
twenty-two years, on the same dates. 
This showed that 45% added to the U.S.G.S. high 
water readings, equalled the readings at the point of 
diversion in the month of May on an average. This is 
the 1nonth in which it is plain that the high water maxi-
mums mostly occur. This seemed to us to be a fair and, 
perhaps, the only appropriate comparison that could be 
made in order to determine the approximate high water 
flow at the point of diversion for the 13 years in which 
we had no readings at the point of diversion. Respond-
ents do not like it, because it proves that 1938 was not 
an exceptionally high water year, as they have assumed 
and have told the Court below and here. 
Now they state (R. bf. 7) that the majority of the 
readings on our page 8, which are the U.S.G.S. readings, 
are below 300 cfs. Since we were only trying to deter-
mine how frequently 300 cfs., or more, is delivered at the 
point of diversion, this is a 1nisleading statement. The 
300 cfs. by U.S.G.S. would show, at least, more than 
400 cfs. at respondents' diversion point. 
We might add, however, that notwithstanding the 
substantial make that occurs in May in the River, be-
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tween the U.S.G.8. point of n1easure1nent and the point 
of diversion, there are a considerable nu1nber of years in 
which the U.S.G.S. reading is 300 cfs., or more, even up 
where these were taken; in fact, in nine out of the twenty-
two years. 
Respondents then c01nplain (R. bf. 10-11) that the 
U.S.G.S. Ineasureiuents are at variance with s01ne of .Mr. 
Searle's readings. If they are, it is too bad for ~1 r. 
Searle. However, his readings have been introduced 
and, on the whole, they do not vary a great deal from 
the pattern set by all the other readings. And our for-
Inula is not "wholly at variance with them'' (R. bf. 10). 
It is based on then1, as well as the other readings. 
Counsel then say that they "could" pick out, and 
they do pick out, an instance where there was more water 
on the san1e day shown in the U.S.G.S. readings up-
stream, than is shown by Mr. Searle at the point of 
diversion. Since it was testified that there were no 
diversions of any consequence between these two points 
(T. 54), this would appear to be impossible, if taken on 
the same exact flow; and so respondents want this Court 
to believe that the U.S.G.S. readings, taken by their En-
gineers who had no interest whatsoever in anyone con-
nected with this suit, and of which we have exact photo-
stats (Ex. "4"), are wrong; and this, even though they 
are entirely consistent with all other readings, except a 
few of Mr. Searle's. 
As a matter of fact, his readings, which respondents 
finally contend are the only correct ones, are the only 
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ones shown to contain inaccuracies, upon their introduc-
tion (T. 38). 
Respondents, for an example, erroneously say (R. 
bf. 10) that on May 13, 1944, the U.S.G.S. readings were 
301 cfs., and Mr. Searle's readings were 225 cfs. That 
would not be too surprising for one day, if true, since 
respondents themselves prove, from two witnesses (T. 
284), that readings at the same point could vary a good 
deal during the same day. This is due mainly to the fact 
that it may be very cold in the morning and warm in the 
afternoon up there. 
But, the fact is that the U.S.G.S. reading (A. bf. 8 
and Ex. "4"), on May 13, 1944, is not 301 cfs., but is 275 
cfs.; and the fact is, also, that Mr. Searle shows two 
readings (Ex. "L") on May 13, 1944, the first one marked 
"A.M:." being 224 cfs., as stated by respondents, but the 
"P.M." reading on that same date was 352 cfs. (Ex. "L", 
p. 1). 
And so, we have for comparison on the "13th" a 
reading of 275 cfs. by the U.S.G.S. and a reading of 352 
cfs. by Mr. Searle, which is a different and a consistent 
picture. 
There may be slight variations, but, taken over the 
whole of the nine years, the result see1ns fairly accurate. 
And, as testified by the Lake Commissioner, the pattern 
is consistent (T. 191). 
Respondents say that in every case in which a simi-
lar test is n1ade "a similar ... divergence will be found". 
But, of course, their claimed "divergence" is wrong, 
because they use the wrong figures, and this statement 
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is incorrect, also. But, it is true that there are a few 
other days when ~lr. :Searle'~ figures, at the point of 
diversion, are lower than the U.S.G.S. readings on the 
san1e date. His Inay be Inorning readings. He does not 
indicate as to this, except occasionally.-
There are no instances that we could find, in check-
ing all of the ~Iay readings, where the Warnock read-
ings or the Gardner readings, or the State Engineer's 
readings, at the point of diversion, are lower than the 
U.S.G.S. readings on the sau1e day. It could be possible, 
however, that, if Mr. Searle took an early morning read-
ing, and U.S.G.S. took one late in the afternoon, that 
~Ir. Searle's reading could be less, and both could be 
correct. 
\Ve are satisfied that the comparisons that we 
made (A. bf. 8-12) are reasonably fair and accurate. 
It is not surprising that respondents are disturbed 
because these figures show that, in the great majority 
of the twenty-two years in which the Government took 
its readings, the high water at their diversion point 
reached a volume which, in the Spring, would thoroughly 
saturate the area. And so that, if water were then held 
back, it would be water which would promptly reach 
the Lake, if not so held. 
Nor can respondents brush aside the showing that 
we have made that, from some inflow readings taken 
in this area, the run-off in the high water year of 1938, 
as compared with 1939 and 1940, which were low water 
years, was very substantially greater in May and in 
June (A. bf. 15), and that, in May of 1938, through 
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American Fork Creek and Spring Creek alone, it was 
more than six times as much as in 1939, and almost four 
times as much as in 1940 (A. bf. 16, and Ex. "11"). 
As we have stated before, the exhibits and respond-
ents' witness, Mr. Richards, testimony shows that 65% 
of the whole flow of American Fork Creek goes down 
in the months of May and June; most of this in May. 
Before leaving Point II, we would like to empha-
size a closely related conclusion to which this case has 
narrowed here, and which seems to us to be very im-
portant. 
The Trial Court mnphatically, and without any find-
ing to guide the State Engineer, reversed him; and a 
complete examination of the briefs and of the records 
and findings here will clearly indicate, we think, that 
it was upon the conclusion that this plan could be put 
into effect and operated, and the rights of the appel-
lants protected, because of two stated reasons, and 
only two reasons, and on two theories only, to-wit: 
(1) That the granting of this application "would 
not injure or disturb vested rights" (R. 99, 114), because 
of finding No. 25 (R. 116) "that for several years in the 
immediate past during the period April 15 to June 15, 
there have been spilled from Utah Lake * * * large quan-
tities of water * * *". 
The fact is that these spillings were earlier than 
this (T. 146-149). And~ in any event, this finding is 
wholly untenable as a support for this reversal on this 
"permanent" change application, or 
(2) In ordering this reversal, the Trial Court is 
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necessarily :::;etting up its judg1nent squarely against the 
judg1nent of the ~tate Engineer on the practical proposi-
tion conunitted hy the Legislature to his discretion that 
this undertaking cannot be ad1ninistered so as to insure 
that vested rights will not be injured. 
Thi:;; Court has held that this eannot legally be 
done (~-\.. bf. G9, 77), and the Idaho Supreme Court has 
so indicated (A. bf. 85-86); and it was on this proposi-
tion that Judge Cardoza said: 
"Courts do not sit in judg1nent upon ques-
tions of legislative policy or administrative dis-
cretion." (A. bf. 86) 
POINT III. 
This point, as will appear from the crux of the 
the issues here,(i;<J is ef fQ.Q gr9atest i:MtiH~rttuu~e t9 t~~ 
~ie~iott hel§ as summed up in the last preced.,W~ 
paragraphs, is one of great importance iD 88t8f&i-'fi{-
State Engineer, as affecting the water policy of the 
State, and the burdens and duties of his office. 
We direct the Court's attention to our stated Point 
III, as it appears on the index page of appellants' brief 
here, and as it is restated (A. bf. 45) and supported 
logically and at length (A. bf. 45-86). 
It will be noticed that respondents (R. bf. 49-59) 
have ignored the law involved in our statement and 
the authorities cited in our brief in support of it. They 
make a statement of their Point III which deals with 
disputes of fact. (See index page and R. bf. 49). 
In the first portion, they simply state that the "State 
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Engineer's assertion * *' * that it cannot be so admin-
istered as to avoid such injury is not supported by the 
evidence." 
And argue that this is so because the State Engineer 
did not testify, and then make the amazing and incorrect 
assertion that the position of the Engineer "has been 
abandoned" by him. 
The only other refutation that is attempted is a 
reliance upon the assertion that the State Engineer's 
position has been entirely "overcome by the findings and 
judgment of the trial court * * * on the trial de novo." 
Not a single authority is cited in refutation of our 
position as supported by the constitutional and statutory 
provisions and numerous authorities cited; nor is any 
authority cited by them in support of any phase of their 
Point III statement. -·.J 
•• ·r We will notice, briefly, the principal contentions of 
respondents·-on this. 
The staten1ent that the State Engineer's decision 
was that the proposed plan "can not be so administered 
as to insure that the rights of lower users will not be· 
injuriously affected," is a correct statement. And this 
statement is quite conclusive against respondents. Their 
statement that it is not supported by the evidence, is 
not correct, and the implication that we have the burden 
of supporting it is wholly untenable. 
Since the Legislature has charged the State Engi-
neer with the duty of determining policies and practices 
of administration as to this kind of change, there seems 
no escape from the proposition that the burden jR on 
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respondent::; to prove that his judg~uent is not only not 
supported, but is so arbitrary or capricious as to a1nount 
to an abu::;e of the discretion expressly vested in him. 
His judgment certainly carries every presumption of 
correctness and validity. 
And so, while it seems that there is no requirement 
that appellants support the Engineer's decision, the evi-
dence by the witnesses, and the entire picture, including 
the 1neasurements, the surface contours, the water con-
ditions at different seasons, and the natural inferences 
frmn all these, support this decision. 
But appellants, in this staten1ent and in their brief, 
appear to make the claim that the decision is not sup-
ported by the evidence because the Engineer did not 
testify. It is true that he did not testify on this matter 
in the Court b~low, and neither did his Chief Deputy, 
who was present there. However, when we offered the 
decision of the State Engineer, which had already been 
pleaded by the respondents, we, as is usual in the prac-
tice, indicated that the Deputy, who prepared the deci-
sion, was present for cross-examination, if respondents 
desired to question him as to the statements contained 
in the opinion (T. 324). And these statements of the 
State Engineer of his reasons, given in support of hif;l 
decision, were specifically offered and received as Ex. 
"12" (T. 324). This is a clear statement of essential 
facts, of the pertinent principals of irrigation law in-
cluded, and the conclusion resulting from these. 
State Engineer's Testimony: 
The respondents' statement that :Mr. Fred W. Cott-
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rell, whose initials appear on the State Engineer's de-
cision (Ex. "12"), participated in preparing the decision 
is correct, as we all know. And we all know that he 
attended all hearings before the State Engineer, together 
with Mr. Ed W. Clyde, who was then attorney for the 
State Engineer, and that Mr. Clyde examined witnesses, 
and they both engaged in the discussions, and later par-
ticipated in preparing the Engineer's decisions. 
And it was this Mr. Clyde who had then collected 
and annotated all the Utah water cases in the two vol-
unles completed in December 1, 1948, as the "Digest of 
Utah Water Law." This work was done in connection 
With Mr. Clyde's work in the State Engineer's Office. 
Mr. Cottrell, a civil and hydraulic engineer, had been 
Chief Deputy in the State Engineer's Office for fifteen 
years (T. 170), and he and 1\Ir. Clyde were and are two 
of the best qualified authorities on water law and admin-
istration in the State. vV e need make no further com-
ment on respondents' repeated attempts to ridicule this 
opinion. It is an intelligent and clear statement, and 
every principle of law in it is sound and correct, and no 
authority has been offered to prove otherwise. 
The statements made by respondents almost at the 
beginning and throughout their brief, to the effect that 
the State Engineer introduced no testimony as to the 
impracticability (R. bf. 2), and that his deter1nination 
"that the application can not be so administered as to 
avoid such injury ... has been abandoned" (R. bf. 24) 
by him, are entirely incorrect, as respondents must know. 
They apparently admit (R. bf. 59) that the State 
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Engineer's decision was before the rrrial Court, and in 
evidence. rrhey seenl to Ininilnize the fon·e and effect of 
this by saying that this was "the very decision which it 
wa:; the court's duty to make anew." However that 1nay 
be, the decision is the state1nent of the Engineer's posi-
tion, and is his state1nent of a number of conditions and 
reasons for his decision. It is in evidence. 
It seen1s foolish to suggest that we should have had 
hun repeat what is in this docu1nent, or re-state it. 
K othing in it has been refuted. It cannot be destroyed 
by son1e layman's contrary opinion, when the statute 
makes the State Engineer's judgment controlling. 
The State Engineer has not abandond his position. 
On the contrary, he was represented at every stage of 
the trial by his attorney and Chief Deputy. His attorney 
signed the Inain brief that was filed by appellants, and 
they have again participated in this brief. His answer 
to respondents' complaint denies every material allega-
tion. 
The question for decision is of vital importance to 
the State Engineer, both as a matter of expense and of 
water administration policy, and the functions of his 
office. Since the litigation and decision here, as this 
Court can take notice, the State Engineer's Office has 
received numerous similar applications which involve the 
same questions, as to withholding out of direct flow 
rights, where lower users' rights depend upon such direct 
irrigation, and where the applications are to withhold 
out of waters which the applicants have a right to then . 
use for direct irrigation, and to then turn down later in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
the season for use on the same land. Several of these 
applications have been denied, and other decisions are 
pending. An additional 23 cases, involving the same 
principal, are now on appeal from the decision of the 
State Engineer. 
Another of the greater mistakes in respondents' 
brief is in the statements that the Trial Court has made 
findings of fact as to the practicability of the operation 
proposed. There is no such finding of fact. There is 
merely a bland conclusion, which is wholly unsupported 
by any findings, at all, or any suggestions as to any 
method that the Engineer might pursue to overcome the 
difficulties suggested by him, or recited by us (A. bf. 52-
56), or at all. We have only a conflict of opinion be-
tween the Court and the administrative officer charged 
with the exercise of discretion as a matter of legislative 
policy. 
Respondents attempt to escape this situation by the 
assertion that the statute provides for a trial de novo 
and, therefore, intended that the Court should so sub-
stitute his judgment. They say that "we all understand" 
the effect of a trial de novo on appeal from the City 
Court (R. bf. 59), but they then absolutely ignore all 
of the decisions and the authorities cited by us on the 
subject of this kind of appeal, including the decisions of 
this Court, and which made a clear distinction between 
that kind of court appeal and appeals from an admin-
istrative officer or board, charged with the exercise of 
judgment and discretion. These point out that the de-
cision of such officers are to be treated as still in exist-
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ence, regardles~ of the appeal and trial de novo, and then 
can be set aside only on legal grounds, or, in cases of 
this character, for abuse of discretion. (See A. bf. 61-74, 
78-86). This Court has 1nade it clear that the opinion 
of the Court cannot be ~ubstituted for that of such ad-
Ininistrative officer. 
And, in answering a si1nilar suggestion, as we have 
pointed out before (A. bf. 70), with reference to this 
statute on trial de naco, this Court (77 P. 2d, at 365) 
said: 
"But Section 100-3-8, supra, does not stand 
alone." 
The Court then cites other sections of the water statute, 
dealing with the State Engineer's powers and duties, 
and gives effect to these. 
All we are asking is that the other sections, involv-
ing the administrative duties and discretion of the Engi-
neer, be considered by the Court in the same manner 
here. It is these sections which proclaim the State pol-
icy, which the Engineer has followed. 
Nor is there any material evidence that the plan, 
which the Engineer found could not be administered 
so as to avoid injury, can be so administered. Respond-
ents' one witness set up ( T. 387-391), in connection with 
his Ex. "EE", what he referred to as an "illustrative 
plan" for a different and theoretical operation. He said, 
as to this function of administration and his testimony, 
that "it can not be determined unless you make certain 
assumptions" (T. 387, line 12). 
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We have pointed out that his assumptions, both as 
to time of storage and as to time of release, and other 
matters, in this theoretical illustration are not in accord-
ance with the application which the Engineer would have 
to administer. To avoid releasing and storing in the 
same period, as the application provides, he assumes to 
store in April, when there can be no storage, for the 
simple reason that the snow will not be melte~, or melt-
ing will barely be commencing in the storage basin. Then 
he assu1nes release of all the water in July, and the 
application contemplates, or requires, no such release. 
Then he assumes use of it on a limited amount of acre-
age, so as to try to give some run-off, when the applica-
tion provides for its use on all the 16,000 acres of land 
on which the water has been previously used, and the 
evidence was without conflict that a good deal of it is 
used on lands not owned or controlled by these respond-
ents. Of course, the water would have to go to those 
having the right to it when it was withheld. 
It is one thing to administer a simplified theory,. 
when you have no responsibility for the outcome. It 
is another thing to try to administer what is actually 
proposed here, with full responsibility. 
We, and the Engineer, have pointed out many causes 
and complications that could not be escaped, and which 
show why this plan cannot be administered, and respond-
ents, as stated in the first part of this brief, have s~g­
gested others. But nowhere is there any suggestion for 
meeting any of these. 
Respondents' answer to all of this is simply the 
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op1n1on of their own paid expert that it is ''feasible," 
and a denial of one of our staten1ents which was to the 
effect that they could not even 1neasure the inflow to 
their proposed reservoir to know how 1nuch was being 
held back, if they were there in the period proposed for 
storage. On a leading question, counsel obtained an 
answer fron1 his witness that: "There shouldn't be any 
practical difficulty" (Tr. 391) in measuring this inflow. 
This staten1ent that the water that cmnes into this 
basin can be n1easured so as to know how much they are 
holding back at any time between April 15 and June 
15, is an utterly ridiculous statement. This proposed 
reservoir, by all the evidence here, is in the nature of a 
lake, or basin. It is described, in the application (Ex. 
"B") as Silver Lake Collecting Basin. This also recites, 
under "Explanatory," that this lake is already being 
used as a sort of reservoir. It is also referred to as 
Silver Lake Flat (T. 183) by one who has seen it, and 
by others, as embracing 35 acres. (See T. 2, 3 and pic-
tures). 
The Engineer who testified that you could measure 
the water that got into it had not seen it. Two witnesses 
testified that they saw the flow of a stream below it 
( T. 402). No witness teti:fied that he had ever seen any 
of the inflows to it. One witness did indicate, and every-
body knows, that it would be normally filled with snow 
until the last snow disappeared at that high elevation, 
and that the last substantial flow of water is from these 
higher snows, and comes in late June or probably July 
(A. bf. 9). 
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In order, apparently, to reduce somewhat this diffi-
culty, as well as other difficulties of administration, re-
spondents (R. bf. 6) deny our statement that the eleva-
tion of this proposed reservoir is 9,000 to 9,500 feet. 
Yet, that is exactly the language used by respondents' 
counsel, in stating the stipulation to which we all agreed. 
He said (T. 215-216): 
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: We'll stipulate that, 
subject to if we get definite inforrnation to the 
contrary * * * that the elevation of the proposed 
reservoir is in the neighborhood of 9,000 feet * * • 
or 9,500 in that vicinity." 
"MR. MULLINER: 9,000 to 9,500." 
"MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes." 
There was never any definite information to the 
contrary, and this stipulation is as to the "proposed 
reservoir" itself. 
As to this plan being "feasible," it perhaps is from 
the standpoint of the respondents, because they would 
doubtless get more water. Their witness is plainly not 
talking about its being practicable or feasible from our 
standpoint; and, still, he does admit that there are sev-
eral difficulties. 
Respondents Admit That Plan is "Impossible of Appli-
cation": 
It is very in1portant to note that the respondents, 
throughout the trial and throughout their brief here, 
have actually refused to recognize that in the proposed 
withholding for storage, the administrator could, in any 
event, legally withhold only such water as they, at that 
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exact ti1ue, would be entitled to use for direct irrigation. 
They assert that this is the theory of their application, 
which it is; but they refuse to recognize the "effect" 
of atte1npting it, because this, at once, sets up one im-
possibility of administration. 
'fhey object to the State Engineer'"s statmuent that 
it would require him to do what they assert their appli-
cation intends to be done. They quote (R. bf. 26), "as 
the very basis of the decision of the State Engineer" 
a part of his opinion, wherein he states : 
.. A direct flow user can only use that portion 
to which his right entitles him, subject to the 
vagaries of weather, conditions of crop, etc. * * * 
the approval of the application granting the right 
to store the water represented by flow rights 
would impose upon an administrator the obliga-
tion of determining, as mentioned hereinbefore, 
when weather conditions on the ground would or 
would not permit the use of water by diversion 
in applying it to beneficial use and time when the 
applicant would not or could not, by reason of 
other conditions, use the water in whole or in 
part by direct diversion. This determination from 
day to day and from time to time would _impose 
a practical impossibility upon an administrator 
...... " 
It seems amazing that anyone would ridicule or 
challenge that accurate statement. It is perfectly basic 
in the law of change of use in irrigation law. But, 
respondents gp on to state that this "entire thesis" is 
challenged as being "wholly unrealistic, impractical, and 
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impossible of application" (R. bf. 26), because it "would 
entangle an administrator in a hopeless web of confu-
sion." 
This is what we have been saying all the time. And 
the plan does require just exactly what the Engineer 
says it does. And, unconsciously, respondents have thus 
come close enough to what is really involved, to recog-
nize the difficulty involved. 
The determination that respondents must have the 
immediate and present right to the use of water, before 
the same could be withheld, is certainly required on this 
proposed application, no matter how "impractical and 
impossible of application" this makes the plan. 
Respondents would not dare say that they could 
withhold water which they were not, at the time of with-
holding, entitled to use, and then attempt to sustain 
their application. 
They go on to say (R. bf. 27) that water rights are 
not administered that way. That the Engineer does not 
watch all water users in the use of their water, and 
make them quit using it when there is a rain-storm, or 
a snow-storn1, or something of that kind. And that, if 
the Engineer applied such reasoning to other storage 
systems, such as Deer Creek, it would prevent the use 
of that, and other such reservoirs. This misses the 
point. The Engineer is not applying this reasoning 
to any such situations. 
And, if respondents would open their minds, they 
would know that this problen1 of administration is not 
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involved in Deer Creek, or other sirnilar storage. 'l,heir 
proble1n here is new and different. 
As this high water now goes down, it does not mat-
ter n1uch to the appellants' rights whether respondents 
put son1e of it out on their ground by direct irrigation 
during a stor1n, or whether they do not then turn it out. 
In either event, n10st of it would reach the Lake prmnpt-
ly. That is not the ad1ninistrative n1atter involved here, 
now. 
The Engineer has not been called upon to tell them 
just when they can or cannot have this water for-direct 
irrigation, and 1nay never be. But, when they propose 
to him that he take and store water for their later use, 
they impose upon him the determination that any such 
water taken is water they would then be legally entitled 
to use. This is what he correctly said; and also what 
respondents say renders the plan "impossible." 
Now, in Deer Creek, the water which is stored there 
is made up of outside water rights, acquired on Weber 
River high water, and water later from the Duchesne 
River, and a filing on Utah Lake. This is brought into 
or held back on the Provo River, and stored. If these 
respondents had acquired a right from Weber, or Du .. 
chesne, and wanted to store it up American Fork Can-
yon, we would have nothing to say. It would then be 
a case, such as they have cited from Colorado (R. bf. 
36), and which we have reviewed, supra, in which new 
water rights were brought into the Big Thompson River, 
in Colorado. 
But here, they say: We want to withhold only 
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water which we are entitled to use at the time of the 
withholding, but we don't want the Engineer to so deter-
mine and to so limit us. 
And, the Engineer says: If I do not withhold only 
such water as you are then entitled to use, you are 
enlarging your right by a change application, which the 
law does not permit. If you do intend that I hold back 
only such water as you are then entitled to use, I must 
make this detennination continuously, and so we encoun-
ter the problem as recited in my opinion. 
And this, with the other things involved, creates a 
situation that is impossible of administration. Clearly 
it is not a situation similar to Deer Creek. 
And respondents' statements that "there are no diffi.! 
culties here which were not encountered in any program 
of storage" (R. bf. 44), and that the difficulties are "less 
than on numerous other irrigation systems" (R. bf. 51), 
and that this is a "simple matter" and "one of ordinary 
water administration" (R. bf. 44), are unsupported and 
incorrect statements. 
Respondents seem to be unable to appreciate the 
position of the State Engineer, or of any of the users 
on this supply, except themselves. 
Another serious misconception which is repeated 
in connection with this Point III also, is contained in 
the statements to the effect that we may not be the only 
ones injured, or the first ones injured, or that others, 
whom we are saying may be injured, did not protest. 
and are not here complaining. 
We have adverted to this before, but we wish to 
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point out that this has nothing to do with the Engineer's 
difficulties of ad1ninistration. He has to administer this 
sche1ne, or plan, in connection with the rights of every-
body else who n1ay be interested in this water, or any 
of it, either before it reaches the Lake, or at any ti1ne 
thereafter. This should be plain without further ('0111-
Inent. 
No Statutor,lJ Requirement that Application be Granted: 
~-\.s we have atte1npted to point out in our main brief 
(A. bf. 66), Respondents appear to contend that the 
Eng~neer has no discretion except to grant their appli-
cation with the condition attached that it shall be "sub-
ject to prior rights." Respondents now somewhat confirm 
that position, but they approach it from a little different 
angle. They quote (R. bf. 55) 100-3-8 that "It shall be 
the duty of the State Engineer upon payment of the ap-
proval fee, to approve an application if," etc., and the 
statute goes on to say "if" there is unappropriated 
water, or the proposed use will not impair existing 
rights, or interfere with more beneficial use, etc. 
Then they follow with the statement that "It will 
be seen that if certain facts exist, it is the duty of the 
State Engineer to approve the application." This con-
tention of Respondents is exactly contrary to the analysis 
of the statutes by Justice Wolfe in the Moyle case. (See 
176 P. 2d at 889). It is pointed out there that this state-
ment would be correct as to applications for temporary 
change, but not as to a permanent change, and, "If cer-
tain facts exist," it is the duty of the State Engineer to 
grant a temporary change. But, as the opinion ·points 
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out, as to applications for a permanent change, both the 
"privilege" of the applicant and the duty of the Engi-
neer depend upon "the element of judgment of the State 
Engineer." 
The analysis in this opinion is clearly sound and the 
position of Respondents as to this kind of an applica-
tion is unsound. It is true that 100-3-8, while applying 
more directly to applications to appropriate, has been 
made to apply to smne features of the application for a 
change in nature of use. This is done by the use of this 
language in 100-3-3 itself: 
"No permanent change shall be n1ade except 
on the approval of the application therefor by the 
State Engineer * * * 
"The procedure in the State Engineer's Office 
and the rights and duties of the applicant with 
respect to applications for permanent changes 
* * * shall be the same as provided in this Title 
for applications to appropriate water." 
Thus the Legislature sought to save time by adopt-
ing the other section dealing with appropriations. But 
the above-quoted language makes this section applicable 
only as to the three things mentioned: ( 1) Procedure; 
(2) Duties of the applicant with respect to applications; 
and (3) "The rights * * * of the applicant with respect 
to applications for permanent changes." 
These do not appear to in any way limit the lan-
guage first above disclosed as to the judgment and dis-
cretion of the State Engineer. The first two, ns to pro-
cedure and as to the duty to make the application in 
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the 1uanner or fol'ln provided, clearly do not have any 
such effect. 
Nor does the third one as to the rights of the appli-
cant, because as this court has at least three times de-
cided, the applicant has no "right" to have this appli-
cation granted. All that he n1ay get is a privilege. (See 
170 P. 2d at 895, Column 1). 
~-\.nd our contentions are not, as asserted by Re-
spondents, contrary to our statutes, but appear to be 
in entire harmony therewith, as well as with the deci-
sions of this court and the law generally, as to the con-
trol by the Courts of Legislative policy or executive 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
We have attempted to cover only some of the prin-
cipal contentions of respondents, which, it appeared, 
might affect questions material to the decision here. 
We believe this and our former brief fully sustain 
the three points relied upon, and as recited in the title 
page of our first brief. 
In other words, the authorities support the position 
that, where lower users have rights dependent upon run-
off from direct irrigation, the withholding for later 
use is not permissible. 
Also, as we have stated in the conclusion to our 
first brief, the natural conditions here and the properties 
and actions of water, when taken in connection. with the 
record, establish that the "effect" of this application 
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would be a diversion affecting lower users, both as to 
time and volume. 
And, in any event, it is certain that on a matter 
of this kind, which is, by statute, made discretionary 
with the State Engineer, the Trial Court may not sub-
stitute its administrative judgment for that of the State 
Engineer, and, particularly, that it may not do so without 
furnishing any facts or suggested method as a guide to 
that official. 
It seems obvious that it must have been due to this 
error on the part of the District Court, or to the more 
glaring error that the release of water from Utah Lake 
into the Jordan River in three years since 1924, caused 
the reversal here. 
We respectfully submit that the reversal by the 
Court was not justified, and should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney General 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, Deputy 
Attorneys for the State Engineer 
C. C. PARSONS, WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corp. 
MULLINER, PRINCE and MULLINER, 
Attorneys for the City and the other 
Associated Canal Companies. 
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